

Supply-side economics brought a new perspective to fiscal policy. Instead of stressing the effects on spending, supply-siders showed that tax rates directly affect the supply of goods and services. Lower tax rates mean better incentives to work, to save, to take risks, and to invest. As people respond to the higher after-tax rewards, or greater profitability, incomes rise and the tax base grows, thus feeding back some of the lost revenues to the Treasury. The saving rate also grows, providing more financing for government and private borrowing. Since Keynesian analysis left out such effects, once supply-side economics appeared on the scene the Democrats could no longer claim that government spending stimulated the economy more effectively than tax cuts.

## 2. President Reagan Asks for a Tax Cut (1981)

PPS 560-563

\* Ronald Reagan scored a stunning electoral victory over Jimmy Carter in 1980, and after his inauguration he set out energetically to cut the federal budget and reduce federal taxes. A former actor and television personality, Reagan used the electronic media with more effectiveness than almost any other modern president—earning for himself the title of Great Communicator. In his nationally televised address of July 27, 1981, reproduced here, Reagan called on Congress to grant a three-year, 25 percent personal income tax cut across the board to all U.S. taxpayers. Why did he feel that such a cut was necessary?

It's been nearly 6 months since I first reported to you on the state of the Nation's economy. I'm afraid my message that night was grim and disturbing. I remember telling you we were in the worst economic mess since the Great Depression. Prices were continuing to spiral upward, unemployment was reaching intolerable levels, and all because government was too big and spent too much of our money.

We're still not out of the woods, but we've made a start. And we've certainly surprised those longtime and somewhat cynical observers of the Washington scene, who looked, listened, and said, "It can never be done; Washington will never change its spending habits." Well, something very exciting has been happening here in Washington, and you're responsible.

Your voices have been heard—millions of you, Democrats, Republicans, and independents, from every profession, trade and line of work, and from every part of this land. You sent a message that you wanted a new beginning. You wanted to change one little, two little word—two letter word, I should say. It doesn't sound like much, but it sure can make a difference changing "by government," "control *by* government" to "control *of* government."

In that earlier broadcast, you'll recall I proposed a program to drastically cut back government spending in the 1982 budget, which begins October 1st, and to continue cutting in the '83 and '84 budgets. Along with this I suggested an across-the-board tax cut, spread over those same 3 years, and the elimination of unnecessary regulations which were adding billions to the cost of things we buy.

<sup>2</sup>Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents 17, no. 31 (August 3, 1981): 814–820.

All the lobbying, the organized demonstrations, and the cries of protest by those whose way of life depends on maintaining government's wasteful ways were no match for your voices, which were heard loud and clear in these marble halls of government. And you made history with your telegrams, your letters, your phone calls and, yes, personal visits to talk to your elected Representatives. You reaffirmed the mandate you delivered in the election last November—a mandate that called for an end to government policies that sent prices and mortgage rates skyrocketing while millions of Americans went jobless.

Because of what you did, Republicans and Democrats in the Congress came together and passed the most sweeping cutbacks in the history of the Federal budget. Right now, Members of the House and Senate are meeting in a conference committee to reconcile the differences between the two budget cutting bills passed by the House and Senate. When they finish, all Americans will benefit from savings of approximately \$140 billion in reduced government costs over just the next 3 years. And that doesn't include the additional savings from the hundreds of burdensome regulations already cancelled or facing cancellation.

For 19 out of the last 20 years, the Federal Government has spent more than it took in. There will be another large deficit in this present year which ends September 30th, but with our program in place, it won't be quite as big as it might have been. And starting next year, the deficits will get smaller until in just a few years the budget can be balanced. And we hope we can begin whittling at that almost \$1 trillion debt that hangs over the future of our children.

Now, so far, I've been talking about only one part of our program for economic recovery—the budget cutting part. I don't minimize its importance. Just the fact that Democrats and Republicans could work together as they have, proving the strength of our system, has created an optimism in our land. The rate of inflation is no longer in double-digit figures. The dollar has regained strength in the international money markets, and businessmen and investors are making decisions with regard to industrial development, modernization and expansion—all of this based on anticipation of our program being adopted and put into operation.

A recent poll shows that where a year and a half ago only 24 percent of our people believed things would get better, today 46 percent believe they will. To justify their faith, we must deliver the other part of our program. Our economic package is a closely knit, carefully constructed plan to restore America's economic strength and put our Nation back on the road to prosperity.

Each part of this package is vital. It cannot be considered piecemeal. It was proposed as a package, and it has been supported as such by the American people. Only if the Congress passes all of its major components does it have any real chance of success. This is absolutely essential if we are to provide incentives and make capital available for the increased productivity required to provide real, permanent jobs for our people.

And let us not forget that the rest of the world is watching America carefully to see how we'll act at this critical moment.

I have recently returned from a summit meeting with world leaders in Ottawa, Canada, and the message I heard from them was quite clear. Our allies depend on a strong and economically sound America. And they're watching events in this country, particularly those surrounding our program for economic recovery, with close

attention and great hopes. In short, the best way to have a strong foreign policy abroad is to have a strong economy at home.

The day after tomorrow, Wednesday, the House of Representatives will begin debate on two tax bills. And once again, they need to hear from you. I know that doesn't give you much time, but a great deal is at stake. A few days ago I was visited here in the office by a Democratic Congressman from one of our Southern States. He'd been back in his district. And one day one of his constituents asked him where he stood on our economic recovery program—I outlined that program in an earlier broadcast—particularly the tax cut. Well, the Congressman, who happens to be a strong leader in support of our program, replied at some length with a discussion of the technical points involved, but he also mentioned a few reservations he had on certain points. The constituent, a farmer, listened politely until he'd finished, and then he said, "Don't give me an essay. What I want to know is are you for 'im or agin 'im?"

Well, I appreciate the gentleman's support and suggest his question is a message your own Representatives should hear. Let me add, those Representatives honestly and sincerely want to know your feelings. They get plenty of input from the special interest groups. They'd like to hear from their home folks.

Now, let me explain what the situation is and what's at issue. With our budget cuts, we've presented a complete program of reduction in tax rates. Again, our purpose was to provide incentive for the individual, incentives for business to encourage production and hiring of the unemployed, and to free up money for investment. Our bill calls for a 5-percent reduction in the income tax rates by October 1st, a 10-percent reduction beginning July 1st, 1982, and another 10-percent cut a year later, a 25-percent total reduction over 3 years.

But then to ensure the tax cut is permanent, we call for indexing the tax rates in 1985, which means adjusting them for inflation. As it is now, if you get a cost-of-living raise that's intended to keep you even with inflation, you find that the increase in the number of dollars you get may very likely move you into a higher tax bracket, and you wind up poorer than you would. This is called bracket creep.

Bracket creep is an insidious tax. Let me give an example. If you earned \$10,000 a year in 1972, by 1980 you had to earn \$19,700 just to stay even with inflation. But that's before taxes. Come April 15th, you'll find your tax rates have increased 30 percent. Now, if you've been wondering why you don't seem as well-off as you were a few years back, it's because government makes a profit on inflation. It gets an automatic tax increase without having to vote on it. We intended to stop that.

Time won't allow me to explain every detail. But our bill includes just about everything to help the economy. We reduce the marriage penalty, that unfair tax that has a working husband and wife pay more tax than if they were single. We increase the exemption on the inheritance or estate tax to \$600,000, so that farmers and family-owned businesses don't have to sell the farm or store in the event of death just to pay the taxes. Most important, we wipe out the tax entirely for a surviving spouse. No longer, for example, will a widow have to sell the family source of income to pay a tax on her husband's death.

There are deductions to encourage investment and savings. Business gets realistic depreciation on equipment and machinery. And there are tax breaks for small and independent businesses which create 80 percent of all our new jobs.



This bill also provides major credits to the research and development industry. These credits will help spark the high technology breakthroughs that are so critical to America's economic leadership in the world. There are also added incentives for small businesses, including a provision that will lift much of the burden of costly paperwork that government has imposed on small business.

In addition, there's short-term but substantial assistance for the hard pressed thrift industry, as well as reductions in oil taxes that will benefit new or independent oil producers and move our Nation a step closer to energy self-sufficiency. Our bill is, in short, the first real tax cut for everyone in almost 20 years. . . .

If I could paraphrase a well-known statement by Will Rogers that he had never met a man he didn't like, I'm afraid we have some people around here who never met a tax they didn't hike. . . .

In a few days the Congress will stand at the fork of two roads. One road is all too familiar to us. It leads ultimately to higher taxes. It merely brings us full circle back to the source of our economic problems, where the government decides that it knows better than you what should be done with your earnings and, in fact, how you should conduct your life. The other road promises to renew the American spirit. It's a road of hope and opportunity. It places the direction of your life back in your hands where it belongs.

I've not taken your time this evening merely to ask you to trust me. Instead, I ask you to trust yourselves. That's what America is all about. Our struggle for nationhood, our unrelenting fight for freedom, our very existence—these have all rested on the assurance that you must be free to shape your life as you are best able to, that no one can stop you from reaching higher or take from you the creativity that has made America the envy of mankind.

One road is timid and fearful; the other bold and hopeful.

In these 6 months, we've done so much and have come so far. It's been the power of millions of people like you who have determined that we will make America great again. You have made the difference up to now. You will make the difference again. Let us not stop now.

Thank you. God bless you, and good night.

### 3. The New York Times Attacks Reagan's Policies (1981)

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\* Critics of President Reagan's budget-slashing and tax-cutting policies fumed furiously but ineffectively during Reagan's first year in office. The new president appeared to be a masterful politician whose will was impossible to thwart. Some observers, however, worried about the real purposes behind Reagan's deft display of presidential leadership. In the following editorial from the New York Times, what are alleged to be Reagan's true intentions? What does the editorial mean when it states that Reagan "gathers power for the purpose of denigrating its value in shaping America"? Is this assessment fair?

<sup>3</sup>Editorial, "The Reagan Paradox," August 2, 1981. Copyright © 1981 by The New York Times Co. Reprinted by permission.

One thing is surely settled: the Presidency is no feeble office. Let a shrewd President single-mindedly pursue a policy broadly grounded in his election mandate, and he can put it across.

It does not follow that Mr. Reagan's economic program is therefore wise or efficient, or that a different program, without tax cuts, could have fared so well. But conservatives did not invent the technique of buying votes with Federal monies; democracy tilts toward gratifying private wants. It is plainly untrue, however, as many have complained, that the democracy of Congress is bound to frustrate the democratic will that elects Presidents.

Nor is it true that Presidential power requires a telegenic face. Rest in peace, Lyndon Johnson. Power lies in circumstance and in the skill with which it is exploited. The Democrats who opposed Mr. Reagan's budget and tax bills played weak hands, but they played them badly. By turning for help to special-interest lobbies, they only challenged the President to outbid them. By forcing a showdown when they lacked decisive strength, they only magnified the drama of his victory.

But is this President's paradoxical triumph also the nation's? He gathers power for the purpose of denigrating its value in shaping America. He does not say the nation is overextended financially. He does not say guns are momentarily more important than butter. He does not rerank the nation's needs or argue against assorted remedies. He denounces all Federal government as oppressive, as the cause of economic distress and a threat to liberty.

So Mr. Reagan has arranged to shrink annual Federal spending by 1984 by about \$150 billion and cut taxes to let individuals and businesses spend that sum instead. Economically, that is mostly a transfer of purchasing power which cannot much reduce inflation or unemployment, the Federal deficit or debt. On the contrary, a big increase in military spending will enlarge the deficit unless the President finds further huge savings in civilian programs. And the pressure to find them—wherever—is what he values most about his accomplishment.

But why does the President boast that he has thus improved economic prospects? Because he holds, as a matter of faith, that a dollar spent privately creates more wealth than a dollar spent by Government.

That is surely sometimes true: a Government-run railroad that is politically beholden to its unions will tolerate more waste than a private bus company. But it surely also is sometimes untrue: a Government investment in a student or road or depressed community can stimulate more productive activity than the same sum spent by private citizens on diamonds or cameras. Government may be incompetent to achieve some of its social goals. But uncoordinated private spending is notoriously inefficient in meeting large public needs.

Take the obvious, urgent need to cool inflation. Mr. Reagan's answer is a tortuous chain of incentives: cut a family's taxes by \$500 and the money goes to banks and merchants who invest in more businesses and machines which will be more efficient and hold down prices. Also: reduce a citizen's tax on the *next* earned dollar from 29 to 25 cents and he'll work harder longer and thus reduce costs.

But if it were primarily interested in economic results, Government has surer ways to achieve those results—as even Mr. Reagan's plan recognizes. For it aims large tax reductions directly at businesses that buy cost-reducing machines or job-

producing plants. A still more efficient plan would have aimed more precisely at the most wanted machines and at workers who hold down wages or communities that reduce sales taxes.

The unavoidable conclusion is that Mr. Reagan wants to use his power primarily to diminish Government—even where that dilutes economic recovery and prevents efficient allocation of resources.

That the President's plan will revive the economy remains to be proved. What is no longer in doubt is that his economic remedies mask an assault on the very idea that free people can solve their collective problems through representative Government. One day soon Americans will rediscover that their general welfare depends on national as well as parochial actions. And then they will want not just a powerful President but one who cherishes the power of Government to act for the common good.

## B. Reagan's Foreign Policies

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### 1. Reagan Sees Red in Nicaragua (1986)

*Central America was shaken by political turmoil in the Reagan years. El Salvador, thrown into chaos by a coup in 1979, was finally stabilized only with the help of U.S. military "advisers." In the same year, a revolution in Nicaragua against the dictator Somoza brought to power a leftist government (the Sandinistas) that President Reagan regarded as a festering thorn in his flesh. He tried repeatedly to win congressional approval for sending military aid to the Nicaraguan "contras," or antigovernment rebels. But American memories of the bloody disaster of Vietnam were still vivid, and Congress balked at giving the president the authority he wanted. On March 16, 1986, President Reagan made the following case for his policy in an emotional television address. What are his strongest and weakest arguments? How convincing are his historical analogies?*

My fellow Americans, I must speak to you tonight about a mounting danger in Central America that threatens the security of the United States. This danger will not go away; it will grow worse, much worse, if we fail to take action now.

I am speaking of Nicaragua, a Soviet ally on the American mainland only two hours' flying time from our own borders. With over a billion dollars in Soviet-bloc aid, the Communist Government of Nicaragua has launched a campaign to subvert and topple its democratic neighbors.

Using Nicaragua as a base, the Soviets and Cubans can become the dominant power in the crucial corridor between North and South America. Established there they will be in a position to threaten the Panama Canal, interdict our vital Caribbean sea lanes and, ultimately, move against Mexico. Should that happen, desperate Latin



of innocence gets confused with the dream of power, and the resident fantasists come to believe their own invented reality—the one they made out of smoke and colored lights when they first arrived in Washington.

During the early years of the Reagan Administration, the President's advisers were wise enough to remember that they had been hired to work on a theatrical production. They staged military pageants in the Caribbean, the eastern Mediterranean, and New York harbor, sustained the illusion of economic prosperity with money borrowed from the Japanese, dressed up the chicanery of their politics in the sentiment of Broadway musicals. They were as lucky as they were clever, and for a surprisingly long time their enemies in the permanent government stood willing to judge the show a success.

The media's applause prompted the President and his companions to mistake the world behind the footlights for the world outside the theater. Flattered by a clique of increasingly belligerent and literal-minded ideologues (among them Vice Admiral John Poindexter, Lieutenant Colonel Oliver North, and Patrick Buchanan) and encouraged by the pretensions of his wife, Reagan came to imagine himself a real, not a make-believe, president. He took to wearing his costume in the street, delivering his lines to passing strangers (among them Mikhail Gorbachev and the Ayatollah Khomeini) with the fond expectation that they would respond with dialogue appropriate to the scene. The most recent reports from Washington suggest that he apparently believed he was leading a Republican renaissance in America, that he had gathered around him not a gang of petty charlatans but a host of selfless idealists, and that in exchange for a Bible and a key-shaped cake, the Iranian despotism would abide by the rules of decorum in effect at the Los Angeles Country Club.

Despite having been repeatedly warned of his possible assassination that last weekend in November 1963, President Kennedy went to Dallas in the firm belief that he couldn't be killed. President Reagan invited the Tower Commission to examine his nonexistent foreign policy and his sentimental variations on the theme of America the Beautiful in the belief that his enemies would accept his ignorance as proof of his virtue.

#### 4. Four Views on the End of the Cold War (1994)

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\* At an extraordinary gathering in the summer of 1994, four of the major figures who played roles in ending the four-and-one-half-decade-long Cold War met in Colorado to assess the process by which the Cold War at last reached its finale. Margaret Thatcher was prime minister of Britain for the entire decade of the 1980s; François Mitterrand was president of France; George Bush served as Ronald Reagan's vice president and was elected president himself in 1988; and Mikhail Gorbachev was the principal architect of the enormous changes that swept through the Soviet Union in the 1980s. How do they agree, and how do they differ, in their appraisals of what happened and why in that momentous decade? Which explanation is most credible?

<sup>4</sup>From M. Gorbachev, M. Thatcher, G. Bush, F. Mitterrand, and B. Mulroney, "What Did We End the Cold War For?," *New Perspectives Quarterly*, 13:1, Winter 1996, pp. 18–28. Copyright © 1996. Reprinted by permission of Blackwell Publishers, U. K.

*Who should get the lion's share of the credit for ending the Cold War? Which of these leaders is most prophetic about the future?*

*Margaret Thatcher.* There was one vital factor in the ending of the Cold War: Ronald Reagan's decision to go ahead with the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI).

The point of SDI was to stop nuclear weapons from reaching their objective. The first nation that got it would have a tremendous advantage because the whole military balance would change. So, it was of supreme importance.

This was a completely different level of defense. It required enormous computer capability, which he knew at the time the Soviet Union could not match. And that was the end of the arms race as we had been pursuing it. I told Mr. Gorbachev when he first visited me that I was all for President Reagan going ahead with SDI and that some of our scientists would help if needed.

From that particular moment, everything was not so easy in my relationship with Mr. Gorbachev. At the same time it was clear that (with Gorbachev) we could negotiate in a different way with a different kind of person who was beginning to allow people in the Soviet Union to have freedom of worship and freedom of speech.

So the end of the Cold War had a great deal to do with Ronald Reagan and a great deal to do with Mr. Gorbachev.

*Mikhail Gorbachev.* I cannot agree that the SDI initiative had this much importance. SDI-type research was also done in our country. We knew that in the defense sector we could find a response. So, SDI was not decisive in our movement toward a new relationship with the West. If you accept that reforms in the Soviet Union started under the pressure from the West, particularly as a result of the implementation of SDI, that would distort the real picture and offer the wrong lesson for the future.

Of decisive importance were the changes within the Soviet Union. They necessarily preceded any change in our external relations.

We had to go a long way from a critical reassessment of the Communist model that was forcibly imposed on our country and that was sustained by repressive measures. With technological progress and the improvement of the educational and cultural level, the old system began to be rejected by people who saw that their initiative was suppressed, who saw they were not able to realize their potential.

Therefore, the first impulses for reform were in the Soviet Union itself, in our society which could no longer tolerate the lack of freedom, where no one could speak out or choose their own party or select their own creed. In the eyes of the people, especially the educated, the totalitarian system had run its course morally and politically. People were waiting for reform. Russia was pregnant.

So, the moment was mature to give possibility to the people. And we could only do it from above because initiative from below would have meant an explosion of discontent. This was the decisive factor, not SDI.

*François Mitterrand.* From the first moment Ronald Reagan mentioned SDI to me I made known my firm opposition. I believed this was an excessive project, and it has since been abandoned. . . .



In the Soviet Union, the need for change went back long before Gorbachev arrived on the scene. Nikita Khrushchev and even Leonid Brezhnev were sufficiently intelligent to transform trends into habits. They made reforms; but the purpose of reform was to guarantee their power. For this reason, Soviet public opinion never trusted or believed in reform. That changed with Mr. Gorbachev. Under him reforms were carried out for the sake of reforms. That is the difference.

*George Bush.* I supported SDI, but you have got to remember that Ronald Reagan was very idealistic on nuclear weapons. Ronald Reagan felt SDI was a way to reduce nuclear terror. As you remember, he offered to share the technology with all countries.

At Reykjavik, he and Mikhail almost hammered out a deal to get rid of nuclear weapons altogether. And Margaret had a fit about it, as did a lot of people in the United States. I suspect François wasn't too pleased either because of the French deterrent.

I disagree with Margaret, though, about the degree to which it forced reform or accelerated change inside the Soviet Union. We had huge defense budgets at that time and they continued on through my administration. SDI was part of that, but it was nothing compared to the overall deployment of nukes all around the world. . . .

*Gorbachev.* During the Chernenko\* funeral, when I spoke with George Bush (then Vice President) and Margaret Thatcher, I was also talking with the leaders of the Eastern European countries. I said to all of them: "I want to assure you that the principles that used to just be proclaimed—equality of states and non-interference in internal affairs—will now be our real policy. Therefore you bear responsibility for affairs in your own country. We need *perestroika* [restructuring] and will do it in our own country. You make your own decision." I said this was the end of the Brezhnev Doctrine.†

I must say they all took a rather skeptical attitude. They thought, "Well, Gorbachev said something about troop reductions at the UN. He is talking about reform at home. He must be in bad shape. He will improve things a little, and then the Soviet Union will go back to its old ways. This is playing the game that is usual with Soviet leaders."

During my years in power we stuck to the policy I announced. We never interfered, not militarily and not even politically. When Gustav Husak from Czechoslovakia and others came to us, we told them we would help them to the extent possible, but "your country is your responsibility."

*Bush.* We were skeptical (about Gorbachev's proclamations on non-interference). We were cautious. We were prudent. We didn't want to provoke something inside these Eastern European countries that would compel the Soviet leadership to take action. . . .

\*Konstantin Chernenko was the head of the Soviet Union from February 1984 until his death in March 1985.

†On the occasion of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev announced the "Brezhnev Doctrine," asserting the right of the Soviet Union to intervene militarily in any Eastern European country where Communist rule was threatened.

*Mitterrand.* What brought everything down was the inability to control the fantastic migration out of East Germany into Hungary and Czechoslovakia, and later to West Germany. That was the end for the Soviet empire.

If Gorbachev had chosen to use force in those countries under Soviet sway, none could have resisted. But he made it known that he considered that option an historical blunder. The very moment that Gorbachev said to the president of the GDR (East Germany) that he did not intend to use force to solve the crisis, that this was a new day and a new deal, that was the end. This was when the big shift occurred. The fault line was not in Warsaw or Prague. It was in East Berlin.

So, the Communist leaders in Germany continued to be Communist leaders, but they no longer led anything. This was a truly popular, peaceful revolution against which they could do nothing. After that, it all broke down, leading to the transformation of Europe and to German unity.

*Bush.* When the Berlin Wall came down, we didn't know whether there were elements inside the Soviet Union that would say "enough is enough, we are not going to lose this crown jewel, and we already have troops stationed there."

In an interview at the time in the Oval Office, I was asked why I didn't share the emotion of the American people over the fall of the Berlin Wall. Leaders of the opposition in Congress were saying that I ought to go and get up on top of the Berlin Wall with all those students to show the world how we Americans felt.

I felt very emotional, but it was my view that this was not the time to stick our fingers in the eyes of Mikhail Gorbachev or the Soviet military. We were in favor of German unity early on and felt events were moving properly.

So, we didn't want to do something stupid, showing our emotion in a way that would compel elements in the Soviet Union to rise up against Gorbachev.

*Gorbachev.* We were not naive about what might happen. We understood that what was underway was a process of change in the civilization. We knew that when we pursued the principle of freedom of choice and non-interference in Eastern Europe that we also deprived the West from interfering, from injecting themselves into the processes taking place there.

As for what was happening within the Soviet leadership at the time, I wouldn't have been able to launch the far-reaching process of reforms alone. There was a group of reformers around me in the very first months of being in office and we set out to change personnel, including in the Politburo and in the provinces, and replace them with fresh forces. It was also at this time—in 1986 and 1987—when I thought that we should expand the democratic process. If we didn't involve the citizens the bureaucrats would eventually suppress all reforms. Without these changes I would have met the fate of Khrushchev. Of course, it was not a smooth process.

*Thatcher.* Unlike George Bush, I was opposed to German unification from early on for the obvious reasons. To unify Germany would make her the dominant nation in the European community. They are powerful and they are efficient. It would become a German Europe.

But unification was accomplished, really, very much without consulting the rest of Europe. We were always amazed that it happened. My generation, of

course, remembers that we had two world wars against Germany, and that it was a very racist society in the second. Those things that took place in Germany could never happen in Britain.

I also thought it wrong that East Germany, whom, after all, we fought against, should be the first to come into the European Community, while Poland and Czechoslovakia, whom we went to war for, had to wait. They should have been free in 1945 but were kept under the Communist yoke until the collapse of the Soviet Union and, even now, are not sufficiently integrated into Europe and suffer from protectionism.

*Bush.* To be very frank, we had our differences with Lady Thatcher and François Mitterrand. Perhaps it was because I didn't share their concerns based on the histories of the two world wars. Maybe it is because America is removed and separated.

But I felt that German unification would be in the fundamental interest of the West. I felt the time had come to trust the Germans more, given what they had done since the end of World War II.

I was convinced, also, that Helmut Kohl would not take a united Germany out of NATO [the North Atlantic Treaty Organization]. I was convinced he would opt for the West and not neutrality between NATO and the Warsaw Pact as Mr. Gorbachev wanted. The whole process moved faster than any of us thought, including Chancellor Kohl. . . .

*Gorbachev.* The German question was the nerve center of our European policy. You will recall that the Soviet position after World War II was that Germany should be united—but as a democratic, neutral and demilitarized country. But that did not happen.

When West German President Richard von Weizsäcker came to see me when I had first become general secretary and asked about my views on Germany, I told him that as result of the war and the system created after the war, two Germanys were an historic reality. History had passed its judgment. Perhaps Germany would reunify in five or ten—or a hundred—years. That was my position then.

At the same time, the Helsinki Process,\* begun in 1975, was underway. That consolidated the postwar realities, among them of a divided Germany, and made it possible for us to normalize relations with Europe. We then became engaged in widespread cooperation with West Germany. Together, East and West Germany were our biggest economic and trade partners. The Federal Republic, to my mind, had also settled all those frontier issues President Mitterrand raised by signing treaties with Poland and Czechoslovakia. All this created the groundwork for the movement to a new situation.

Of decisive importance, though, was the launching of perestroika in the Soviet Union. It affected public opinion in all the central and eastern European countries, but especially in East Germany.

When I went to the GDR to participate in the 40th anniversary celebrations

\*Representatives of thirty-four nations met in Helsinki, Finland in July 1975 and officially ended World War II. The agreements signed at Helsinki recognized the Soviet-dictated boundaries of divided Germany, Poland, and other East European countries. In return, the Soviets agreed to liberalization of educational and other exchanges between East and West. The Helsinki accords also stimulated dissident movements throughout Eastern Europe to organize and assert claims for political and human rights.



in October 1989 there was a torchlight parade organized by the leaders. The marchers were carefully selected from 28 districts around the GDR. They were people who were supposed to be "reliable." But they began to shout slogans demanding democracy and perestroika for the GDR.

The Polish premier came to me and said: "This is the end." This had become the reality. And politicians have to accept realities.

For us the German reunification issue was the most difficult one. For President Bush and the US Administration the key issue was the future of NATO. And, today, as we see how NATO is being pushed forward instead of a European process of building common institutions, we understand why it was their concern. That is a problem.

The president of France was concerned about borders and territory. Mrs. Thatcher had geopolitical concerns about who would dominate Europe. Everyone had questions.

But I can tell you those questions cannot even be compared with the problems the Soviet leadership was facing given our enormous sacrifices during the war. So, for us, taking the decision on German unification was not easy. We had to go a very long way. We thought the process would take a long time and would be coordinated with the building of new European institutions under the umbrella not of the Americans, but of a European process.

Like Chancellor Kohl, we thought that initially there would be some kind of association of German states, a confederation perhaps.

Then history began to speak when the masses created a new reality more rapidly than any of us were prepared for. Suddenly all these questions were put in a new frame.

We had ended the Cold War and said, as George Bush and I did in Malta, that we would no longer regard each other as enemies. We had come a long way in opening freedom in our country. We dismantled the totalitarian system, launched perestroika in the Soviet Union and reforms in Eastern Europe. The entire world had moved into a new stage of development.

Was all this to be sacrificed by trying to stop what the Germans themselves wanted by moving in troops? No. Only the political process was available to us. And the political process is constrained by the realities of what the people want. We had to recognize the free expression of the Germans.

President Bush was right about Germany. The Germans had accepted democratic values. They had behaved responsibly. They had recognized their guilt. They had apologized for that past, and that was very important.

So, as difficult as it was, it was inevitable that the Soviet leadership took decisions consistent with this reality. . . .

*Mitterrand.* We too wanted to avoid the military test in the Baltics because this would jeopardize the position of Mikhail Gorbachev. At the same time, for him to accept the unconditional independence of revolting nations was to accept dislocation of the whole. . . .

I believe that in the next century a new synthesis must be found between the two requirements stressed by President Gorbachev—the need for integration as well as the need to affirm individual personality, sovereignty and rights in different areas. And this is by no means a done deal.

The separation of the Czechs and Slovaks is a good example, but there will be other less harmonious separations in Europe. And let us hope it is not contagious and spreads to the American continent.

The aspiration for national identity is clearly understandable after what Mrs. Thatcher called the fallen empires—certainly the main feature of the 20th century. The end of empire releases ethnic and tribal groups. Each goes it alone, wanting to enjoy all the trappings of sovereignty. But that is not possible. It clashes with the other basic trend of globalization.

So, a synthesis is necessary. Though Lady Thatcher does not agree, that is what we are doing within the European community. Shall we succeed in effecting a synthesis between this need for great aggregates and this incipient need of each small community to affirm itself as such?

Absurd, would it not be, to encourage each splinter of a truth to lead an independent international life? And yet, it is injustice to prevent anyone from doing so.

So, in the next century the world must create the rule of law that protects minorities, enabling them to live freely with most of the attributes that makes it possible to meet their national aspirations. At the same time national organizations must be created so that each country can maintain its cohesiveness.

If we do not do this, we shall see a tremendous scattering and breaking away. No one will be immune. The need for decentralization in the US or Canada will prevail over a federal state. And it will be the same in Brazil, in Spain, in Belgium. There would be no end, no way out.

Will we have political leaders capable of conceiving the organization of this huge world with a few major coordination centers obeying international laws set by the international community, and at the same time making minority rules that enable each to live according to his or her yearning?

Enough said. A new generation is rising. They will have to answer this question.

## C. Social Issues Enter Politics

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### 1. Newt Gingrich and Lowell Weicker Debate School Prayer (1984)

*Two Supreme Court decisions in the early 1960s effectively prohibited the recitation of prayers in public schools: Engel v. Vitale (370 U.S. 421 [1962]) and Abington School District v. Schempp (374 U.S. 203 [1963]). The ban has rankled many churchgoing Americans ever since. They found their champion in Ronald Reagan, who called for a constitutional amendment to permit prayer in the schools, and also*

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<sup>1</sup>From Pro and Con—"Permit Prayers by Students in Public Schools?" *U.S. News & World Report*, 1984. Copyright 1984 U.S. News & World Report, L.P. Reprinted with permission.

save more for our own retirement, as well as bear a share of our parents' Social Security benefits. For individual pensions to accumulate and provide an adequate retirement income, they will have to be based on substantial contributions. This means that workers will have to continue to pay a portion of Social Security, contribute the rest to a personal, mandatory account, and contribute additional savings to their personal account. But it is my belief that young workers will accept this burden if they are given the opportunity and the incentive to save more money themselves, watch their money grow and know that the money will be there for them when they retire.

A recent Third Millennium study found that 62% of young people would be more likely to support a presidential candidate who advocated a personal investment plan. That figure compares with only 6% of young people who said they would be less likely to vote for such a candidate. This issue will grow in importance and urgency as young people continue to realize where their FICA taxes go under the current system, and where that money could go under a different system.

I believe our nation's ultimate challenge is farsightedness. Would a private business, knowing that financial disaster is pending, wait until tomorrow to deal with the situation? Would an individual family, realizing it is running into financial troubles, wait until tomorrow to change course? Why, then, should the Federal government be held to any lower standard?

Every generation of Americans has its own assets and liabilities, and I truly don't believe that most people in my generation are whining about the future we are inheriting. But we can no longer sit idly by as politicians compromise our economic future and, more importantly, the future of our children, to pacify powerful special interest groups. Young people have an obligation, both as citizens and as the parents of the next generation, to offer solutions, to have a voice and to demand action. We are willing to sacrifice because we know the consequences to our generation and to future generations if we do not. We are willing to accept reduced benefits and an increased retirement age. But we are not willing to accept inaction on the part of today's leaders. And I do not think my generation will accept increased payroll taxes for programs that the experts all tell us will be bankrupt by the time we retire.

It is crucial for all Americans that we begin to confront Social Security today. To avoid action now is a moral and economic assault on future generations. If we seize the opportunity, however, I believe we can embark on a course that will boost national savings, invest in the future and secure our ailing retirement system.

E. Can the United States Still Afford to Be a Nation of Immigrants?

I. The Puzzling Economics of Immigration (1996)

pgs 627-631

\* America has long been an immigrant nation, and most Americans are proud of their heritage. But as immigration rose to unprecedented levels in the 1970s,

<sup>1</sup>From Susan Dentzer, "Adding and Subtracting," *U.S. News & World Report*, April 29, 1996, p. 37. Copyright 1996 U.S. News & World Report, L.P. Reprinted with permission



1980s, and 1990s, debate intensified about the desirability of keeping the immigration doors open. Among the most contentious aspects of the controversy was the question of whether immigration imposed economic costs or conferred economic benefits on American society. The following selection attempts to sort out the economic dimension of immigration—a surprisingly complex and challenging task. What are the principal questions that must be answered before this issue might be settled? Should immigration policy be based on economic considerations alone? Why, or why not?

*Give me your tired, your poor,  
Your huddled masses yearning to breathe free—  
And I will perform a cost-benefit analysis  
To determine if immigrants are a good deal for America.*

Fortunately, Emma Lazarus was a poet, not a policy wonk, and thus never wrote those lines. But given the tenor of the current immigration debate, it's easy to imagine such sentiments being carved today beneath the Statute of Liberty. Consider the economic and pseudo-economic arguments for and against immigration. On one hand, somewhat inconsistently, immigrants are said to run up the tab for programs such as welfare and to steal jobs from the native born. On the other, immigrants are extolled as ethnic Horatio Alger characters who work hard, study hard, launch new businesses and add, like Albert Einstein, to the nation's store of human resources.

The reality is that even though research in the field has flowered in recent years, we still know little that is definitive about immigration's economic consequences. Economists bitterly debate the range of topics—for example, whether or not immigrants pay more in taxes than they soak up in benefits like welfare or Medicaid. Still worse, from the standpoint of fairness, we seem to know far more about the probable costs of immigration than we know about its often unmeasurable benefits, like the value of a diverse workplace in an era of global markets. But this doesn't mean the anti-immigration arguments carry the day. What it does mean is that it's futile to try to determine whether immigration is a net economic plus or minus—and about as useful as evaluating motherhood, patriotism or other tried-and-true American values on the basis of costs and benefits.

Hard questions. It's tough to answer the big economic questions about immigration—for example, what impact the inflow of foreigners has had on overall U.S. economic growth. One key reason is that it is hard to figure out which came first, the immigrants or the growth: While immigration may have spurred America's growth, foreigners have been attracted here because the economy was growing. Probably the best we can safely say is that the arrival of tens of millions of foreigners has not had a significant adverse effect on the economy. Consider employment: More legal immigrants flooded into the United States during the 1980s than during any other decade since the peak flows of 1900–1910. Even so, overall job growth boomed during the '80s, and by 1989 the unemployment rate had fallen to a low 5.3 percent.

Immigration's most discernible effects have probably been on wages. When new immigrants arrive, their primary effect is to drive down the wages of immi-

grants who came earlier, since a bigger pool of similarly situated people is now competing for similar jobs. That's a long-standing phenomenon that can be traced back at least to the 19th century, when New York's immigrant garment workers lost ground when the next wave showed up, says Harvard economic historian Claudia Goldin. But today, immigration may also have noticeable effects on the wages of low-skilled, native-born workers.

Consider today's immigrants, roughly four fifths of whom are from Asia and Latin America, and who on average have had fewer years of schooling than native-born Americans. Harvard economists George Borjas, Richard Freeman and Lawrence Katz argue that this influx of less-educated people helps explain as much as one third of the widening pay gap between low-skilled and highly educated U.S. workers during the 1980s. Other economists dispute that—and at any rate, Borjas and his colleagues agree that immigration probably has played no larger role in America's widening wage gap than the decline of labor unions and the growth of trade. Moreover, immigration almost certainly played a smaller part in the growing gap than the biggest contributor yet identified: rapidly changing technology that dried up opportunities for America's low-skilled workers.

If immigration has some role in pushing down the wages of low-skilled Americans, it may also be pushing them around, period. From 1990 to 1995, notes University of Michigan demographer William Frey, 2 out of 3 immigrants newly arrived in the United States ended up in just 10 metropolitan areas, including New York, Los Angeles, Chicago and Houston. At the same time, tens of thousands of low-skilled Americans seemed to be leaving many of those areas—for example, departing California, which suffered a recession during much of that period, for new homes in Nevada or the Pacific Northwest. What role immigrants played in decisions to move isn't clear, Frey says. "But it would be nice if we could distribute immigrants around the country somewhat more evenly," he adds, to blunt the effect on native-born people in already heavily populated areas.

What other effects might the influx of low-skilled immigrants have on the broader economy? It sounds callous, but for many Americans, the results may not be all bad. If immigrants drive down wages for restaurant workers or lower the price of dry cleaning, that means cheaper meals and cleaning bills for better-off people, says Yale economist Jennifer Hunt, currently a national scholar at Stanford's Hoover Institution. This dynamic underscores a potentially important economic aspect of immigration: It effectively transfers wealth from native workers to those who use the services of immigrants.

Perhaps the most contentious question is whether immigrants "pay their own way"—that is, whether they pay enough in taxes to offset the costs they impose on society. Depending on what you count, it is possible to answer yes or no. For example, Urban Institute researcher Jeffrey Passel calculates that in 1992, the taxes paid by immigrants who arrived in 1970 or later outstripped their costs for welfare and other social services by \$27 billion. But economist Borjas says that reckoning neglects immigrants' heavy use of schools and other public services. In fact, he contends, immigrants didn't pay their way that year, to the tune of about \$16 billion.

Uneven burdens. Now consider what happens when you add immigrants'

Social Security and Medicare taxes—benefits that working-age immigrants won't collect for years. Under the calculus, immigrants more than pay their way, contends Stephen Moore, an economist at the Cato Institute in Washington. Perhaps all we can say with confidence is that immigrants may be "overpaying" their way at the federal level and "underpaying" at the state and local level, which funds the lion's share of services like schools and roads. That could argue for federal "impact aid" to areas with the biggest immigrant populations.

Even if immigrants impose some higher costs on society, it could be that it is worth making that investment in order to capture other benefits from immigration. Unfortunately, we know almost nothing about those benefits, since few economists have evaluated them. An exception is George Borjas, himself a Cuban immigrant, who tried to come up with what he calls a "back of the envelope" estimate of how much immigration increases the national income each year. His conclusion: somewhere between \$7 billion and \$25 billion—a pittance in a \$7 trillion economy.

In the absence of more work in this vein, all we really have are disjointed anecdotes about immigration's benefits. For example, a new report published by the UCLA Asian American Studies Center and the Leadership Education for Asian Pacifics, a nonprofit group, calculates that businesses owned by Asian-Pacific Americans had sales of more than \$33 billion by the late 1980s and employed more than 350,000 workers. Then there's Social Security: The fact that immigrants have higher birth rates than the native population means the system is somewhat healthier than it otherwise would be, since more younger workers—the offspring of immigrants—are helping foot the bill for oldsters' pensions. In fact, the Cato Institute estimates that cutting legal immigration by almost half, as some lawmakers have proposed, would require raising taxes or cutting Social Security benefits by \$5.6 billion a year to avoid worsening the system's long-run insolvency.

Given how little we know about the economics of immigration, how, if at all, should we amend our immigration policies? If the objective of immigration is solely to increase the nation's wealth—and that's a big "if"—we might do two things. We'd enforce our immigration laws better to stem the flow of largely unskilled illegal workers—and we'd shift to a system of legal immigration that admitted people primarily based on their level of skills, rather than on their family ties, as the current system does. The infusion of better-educated people would take less of a toll on low-skilled workers' wages and expand the nation's stock of human capital. Yet while this might make economic sense, as a society, we seem in conflict: We're troubled that highly skilled workers might also see their wages fall—or lose their jobs—when foreign-born professionals showed up, willing to work for lower pay. "The U.S. has this 'terrible' problem," says Yale economist (and Australian native) Hunt. "The smartest people in the world want to come here"—and we can't get over it.

On the other hand, lest we fret too much about the low-skilled immigrants arriving on our shores, it is useful to remember that Americans don't have a good track record in predicting how immigrants will fare. It's also an apparent obligation of U.S. citizenship to complain that the next boatload to arrive won't be as great as your own boatload was. Benjamin Franklin once carped that German immigrants to



America would never master the English language or assimilate into American society. Two centuries later, this writer, descended from a 19th-century immigrant from Bavaria, would have to disagree.

## 2. Immigration and Poverty (1996)

*Columnist Robert Samuelson argues in the selection below that the issues of widening income inequality and immigration are related. How sound is his analysis? What does he think of proposals to deny immigrants access to public services, such as education? What are likely to be the long-term contributions—or costs—of the massive immigrant wave of the past three decades?*

As a nation, we are importing poverty. That is the clearest consequence of the surge of immigration that began in the early 1970s. I do not say this to be alarmist or to advocate any type of immigration legislation. I say it merely to highlight an important truth that's usually overlooked in our political discussions of other social issues, ranging from poverty to the lack of health insurance. We deceive ourselves by discussing these matters as if immigration has had little effect on them.

The silent assumption is that the population is static. If poverty hasn't declined, then something must be making it harder for people to escape poverty. If more people lack health insurance, then insurance must be much less available. If income inequality has risen, then something must be widening the gap between the "haves" and "have-nots." But the population isn't static. Many people at the bottom are immigrants, and because they arrive poor, they instantly aggravate all these problems. They take lousy jobs with low wages and no insurance.

In any one year, new immigrants (about 800,000 of them legal and perhaps 300,000 illegal) don't much alter social conditions. But the cumulative impact is significant. Between 1970 and 1994, immigrants rose from 4.8 percent to 8.7 percent of the population. Counting their American-born children amplifies the effect. And the new immigrants come from different countries than the old. In the 1950s, two-thirds of a much smaller number came from Europe and Canada. By the 1980s, nearly half came from Mexico, other parts of Latin America and the Caribbean; almost 40 percent came from Asia.

It is not simply that many new immigrants are desperately poor and don't speak English. That's often been true. More important, many don't achieve the rapid income gains of some earlier immigrants. Wages of many European immigrants approached (or even exceeded) the levels of native-born Americans after 10 or 15 years. A new study by the Rand Corp., a research organization, shows that this is still true for Europeans and also applies to many Asian immigrants. In 1990 wages for European immigrants who arrived in the late 1970s were 10 percent above those of American-born workers; for Asians who arrived in the late 1970s, wages were 15 percent higher in 1990.

<sup>4</sup>Robert Samuelson, "Importing Poverty," © 1996, *Newsweek*. Reprinted with permission.

B. American Women: New Roles, New Problems

I. Nannerl Keohane Analyzes the "Glass Ceiling" (1991)

pgs 609-611

\* Spurred by a militant feminist movement, women marched by the millions into the workforce and into all kinds of previously all-male strongholds in the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s. But they rarely marched at the head of the column; rather, leadership positions remained a virtual male monopoly, and a "pink-collar ghetto" of predominantly female occupational categories emerged. Nannerl Keohane, then president of Wellesley College, an all-women's institution, here describes the particular problems women face in the modern era. What does she see as the principal obstacles to women's further advancement in the workplace? How likely are those obstacles to be overcome in the future?

My topic is leadership—a sorely needed skill in our country and our world these days; and particularly women leaders—an even scarcer phenomenon; and how we might prepare more women to be leaders in the future.

Thinking about women in leadership can lead to very different conclusions depending on where you look, and how you look at it. It's like the old joke about the optimist—who thinks this is the best of all possible worlds—and the pessimist—who agrees with her.

First, the optimist's perspective:

More and more women are holding leadership positions around the world these days. There are women generals and women judges, women neurosurgeons and opera conductors and newspaper editors and even, occasionally, a woman CEO.

Such new leaders join the legions of strong women who have traditionally been leaders in more familiar fields: in early childhood education, on the boards of symphonies and art museums, in the soup kitchens and in the peace movement, in all kinds of non-profit organizations that so enrich our lives.

There are more women in politics, as well, more women governors, mayors, even presidential and vice-presidential candidates these days. If someone had said ten years ago that the mayors of several of America's largest cities in 1990 would be women, or that one-half the cabinet, one-half the legislature, and the prime minister of Norway would be female, they would have been laughed out of court.

The clearest indicator that women have made our mark in positions of leadership in our society may be that we have begun to engage in some traditional male behavior surrounding leadership. I read not too long ago about a typical political "roasting session," with one unusual feature: all the participants were well-known women political figures. Some of the feminist old guard—Bella Abzug, Gloria Steinem and so forth—were roasting Geraldine Ferraro.\* One of the questions went

\*"Educating Women for Leadership" by Nannerl O. Keohane, delivered to the City Club of Cleveland, April 26, 1991. Reprinted by permission of Nannerl O. Keohane, President of Duke University.

\*Bella Abzug was a U.S. Representative from New York in the 1970s; Gloria Steinem, a prominent feminist, founded *MS* magazine; Geraldine Ferraro was a U.S. Representative from New York and as Walter Mondale's running mate on the Democratic ticket in 1980, she became the first woman nominated for vice president by a major political party.

as follows: "What can we learn about women in politics from Geraldine Ferraro's vice-presidential candidacy?" The answer: "Don't get married."

Still, the pessimist insists, the examples I've cited of women at the top can hardly be taken to be typical of us all. Many things still stand in the way of women ambitious for leadership in politics, in corporate life, in colleges and universities. It is true that women are gaining *entry* to many fields in increasing numbers; but there are still very few women at the top, however visible and successful those few may be. The problem lies not in getting your Ph.D. or your MBA—but in moving from the troops to the top jobs, through the shoals of middle management, where most women seem to founder. What happens between the bottom and the top?

A first cut at an explanation holds that it's simply a matter of time. The women who are coming in today will be the leaders of tomorrow, in a kind of "trickle-up" phenomenon. Thus, all we have to do is wait for them to make their progress up the ladder in numbers commensurate to the MDs and MBAs, and then the problem will be solved. But this is surely too sanguine; for there is a specific problem area five or ten years after young women are hired and begin their professional development, when it's time to get the big promotion, become a partner, run for office, or get tenure. At this point, many women get sidetracked, lower their ambitions, downplay their careers.

A great deal has been written about this: images have been used—especially the "glass ceiling." Using a metaphor from one of my favorite sports—running—I like to call this problem "the Wall." It's like hitting a wall when you're running smoothly. All of a sudden you run out of steam, bumping into an obstacle that seems almost physical, blocking your path. What causes this depressingly familiar phenomenon in our careers? And how can women break through "the wall," or the "glass ceiling" to become leaders in corporate, political and professional careers?

According to one explanation, the problem lies with men: men control the gateways to success, and they are reluctant to let women in. Men fear successful women, are uncomfortable with women leaders, resist threats to male bonding and changes in the familiar scenery. So when it comes time for the big promotion, they look for reasons to promote a man instead.

We cannot discount male chauvinism; it still accounts for a significant part of the obstacles that women face. But there are many confident CEOs and political leaders who really want women to succeed—either because they have become sensitive to women's talents and needs (perhaps because of an ambitious and eager daughter), or because they can do the cold arithmetic about the changing work force or the demographics of the women's vote.

Other kinds of explanations for the glass ceiling attribute the problem to something that is wrong with women—perhaps we lack ambition; perhaps women do not really want other women to succeed. These explanations may have worked in the past, when ambitions were systematically suppressed and even ridiculed; when the rare woman who made it to the top had fought so hard that she could not bring herself to accept the fact that young women coming up behind her might make it more easily, with her help. But today, young women fresh out of business school or law school seem just as ambitious as their brothers, and they show no fear of the successes that come to them at the start of their careers. And many successful

women nowadays do indeed want other women to succeed, and go out of their way to help them do so.

One more suspicion may be lurking about an explanation for the glass ceiling. Maybe women most of all want to have babies, and when the biological clock begins ticking in our thirties, our bodies realize this and no matter how ambitious or energetic we had been about our jobs, we go back to nature. Of course, men want to have families as well, and they may also succumb to the lure of hearth and home at about that same age. But the *consequences* of heeding the biological clock are very different for women and for men.

Traditionally, at least, when the young bachelor marries, he acquires a loving helpmate who prepares his meals and raises his children and gives smashing dinner parties to advance his career; all of which, if he marries wisely, wins the approval of his superiors and his peers, and gives him new advantages in the competition for professional success, smoothing his way to the top. But the young woman who marries is expected to take on a second job, as busy as the first, and become a successful homemaker and mother at the same time as she struggles for professional recognition.

We are all aware of the difficulties of combining career and family; even with the cooperative and supportive partner, the demands are enormous. And women still take responsibility for almost all the housework and a large proportion of child-care. As we also know, statistics show that a large and growing majority of women of child-bearing age are employed outside the home. Yet jobs are still constructed with the expectation that there will be one partner in the home, and the other in the workforce, even though only a small percentage of Americans actually live that way these days.

High-powered jobs, leadership jobs, mean you have to be available many nights and weekends. Such jobs make no allowance for the fact that Johnny might get sick or Mary have the starring role in the school play. Our society has woefully inadequate support systems for young children and working parents, and these facts bear most heavily on mothers. In such a setting, it is hardly surprising that few women manage to sustain their ambitions long enough to make it to the top. For significant change to occur in the pattern of women in leadership, there will need to be more flexibility in our expectations for how one performs in high-powered jobs at different stages in one's life, and also changes in the support systems for working parents. . . .

## 2. Women Assault The Citadel (1995)

*In 1995, after lengthy legal proceedings to clear the way, Shannon Faulkner became the first woman to enroll at The Military College of South Carolina (known as The Citadel), a historically all-male military college in Charleston, South Carolina. Within days, she withdrew, prompting a nationwide debate on the suitability of*

<sup>2</sup>"A Lesson from the Citadel in Double Standards," *San Francisco Chronicle*, August 25, 1995. Cynthia Tucker's column is reprinted courtesy Chronicle Features, San Francisco, California. All rights reserved.